Subsidies of the Australian clean energy package by Deane, Felicity
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Deane, Felicity Jane (2013) Subsidies of the Australian clean energy pack-
age. The Journal of Law and Financial Management, 12(2), pp. 21-41.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/64572/
c© Copyright 2013 The University of Sydney
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
 
 
  
 The Subsidies of the Australian Clean 
Energy Package 
The Australian Clean Energy Package has been introduced to respond to the 
global challenge of climate change and reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
It includes legislation to establish an emissions trading scheme. In support of the 
entities that are liable under this Package, there are a number of assistance measures 
offered to alleviate the financial burden that the Package imposes. This paper 
considers whether these assistance measures are subsidies within the context of the 
law of the World Trade Organization. In order to do this, the rules of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures are examined. This examination enables 
an understanding of when a subsidy exists and in what circumstances those subsidies 
occasion the use of remedies under the law.  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Clean Energy Package (the Package) was introduced in Australia in July 
2011. The underlying purpose of the Clean Energy Package is to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions in order to respond to both the global challenge of climate 
change and the obligations of the international climate change regime.1 The Pacakge 
includes legislation to establish an emissions trading scheme (ETS). Further, 
assistance measures have been introduced to alleviate the economic stress caused by 
the introduction of the Package, in particular the carbon pricing mechanism (the 
CPM). This paper considers the assistance measures of the Package in the context of 
the WTO subsidies laws.  
There are a significant number of assistance measures introduced by the 
package. Of particular relevance to the WTO law are two assistance measures: the 
Jobs and Competitiveness Program (the JCP) and the Energy Security Fund (the 
ESF).2 These measures are closely related to the CPM and provide assistance through 
                                                
1 Australian Government, Commonwealth of Australia, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The 
Australian Government’s Climate Change Plan (2011) v; Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s3.  
2Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) pts 7 and 8. 
free unit distribution. In addition, this paper considers one of the programs of 
assistance that is legally segregated from the Australian CPM, the Steel 
Transformation Plan Package (the STPP). The STPP is introduced through its own 
standalone legislative instruments.3  
By considering the Package assistance measures, the overriding purpose of this 
paper is to consider the compliance of each of these with the law of the WTO. In this 
regard, each assistance measure is analysed separately to determine if it infringes the 
requirements of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (the SCM 
Agreement)4 or any other WTO annexed agreements.  
This paper is divided into four parts. In part one of this paper an overview of the 
WTO law regulating subsidies is provided. This paper focuses on the law within the 
SCM Agreement, in particular the definition of subsidies within this agreement.  In 
part two of this paper the JCP is examined. In this part, the requirements of prohibited 
subsidies are examined in detail.  The third part of this paper examines the STPP. This 
paper considers the STPP alongside other assistance measures available to the steel 
manufacturing industry to consider the collective impact of these measures within the 
context of the law of the WTO. Finally this paper considers the ESF assistance 
scheme. Although there are a number of characteristics of the ESF that are similar to 
the JCP, the nature of the ESF and its purpose as an assistance package for energy 
security leads to unique features that require separate analysis.  
1.2 THE WTO RULES REGULATING SUBSIDIES 
1.2.1 THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDIES  
The laws of the World Trade Organization (WTO) impose requirements that 
relate to the use of subsidies by members. Historically, subsidies have been used by 
states to protect domestic entities from competition and to maintain export levels. In 
some cases subsidies may be granted for legitimate policy purposes, such as 
                                                
3 Steel Transformation Plan Act 2011 (Cth). 
4 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force1 January 1995) Annex 1A ('Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures'). 
environmental objectives. Despite the potential benefits of subsidies, their existence 
can undermine free trade.5   
For the most part the WTO law requirements for subsidies are set out in the 
SCM Agreement. In addition to the SCM Agreement, rules on subsidies can be found 
in the Agreement on Agriculture,6 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the 
GATT)7 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (the GATS).8 The focus of 
this article is on the rules contained within the SCM Agreement, although the rules 
within the GATT and the GATS are also briefly considered.  
The SCM Agreement contains the first instrumental definition of subsidies 
conceptualised since the inception of GATT.9 Commentators suggest this definition 
applies across each of the agreements regulating subsidies.10  It is through this 
definition that members identify the scope of the SCM Agreement. As noted in the US 
– Softwood Lumber III dispute, ‘[a] subsidy is exhaustively defined in Article 1 of the 
SCM Agreement.’11    
The definition of a subsidy is contained in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. It 
states that 
a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body 
within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as 
"government"), i.e. where: 
                                                
5See discussion, Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (Penguin Books Ltd, 2002) 244 – 
245. 
6 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force1 January 1995) Annex 1A ('Agreement on Agriculture'). 
7 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force1 January 1995) Annex 1A ('General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994'). 
8 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force1 January 1995) Annex 1B ('General Agreement on Trade in 
Services 1994'). 
9 Sadeq Z Bigdeli, 'Incentive Schemes to Promote Renewables and the WTO Law of Subsidies' in 
Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the 
Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 155, 157. 
10 Pietro Poretti, The Regulation of Subsidies within the General Agreement on Trade in Services of the 
WTO (Kluwer Law International, 2009) 111. 
11 Panel Report, United States — Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc WT/DS236/R (27 September 2002) 7 [4.26]. 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, 
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities 
(e.g. loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected 
(e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits)1; 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or 
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions 
illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally 
followed by governments; 
  or 
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI 
of GATT 1994; 
and 
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.12 
Therefore, the three criteria for a subsidy to exist in accordance with the SCM 
Agreement are: 
• a financial contribution is made;  
• the contribution is made by a government;13 and,  
• a benefit is conferred as a result of the financial contribution.14 
This paper will consider both the first and the third criteria in more detail. The second 
criterion is less likely to cause panel deliberations. This is especially the case for 
certain categories of financial contribution.  
                                                
12 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force1 January 1995) Annex 1A ('Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures') Article 1.1. 
13 Carol Ni Ghiollarnath, Renewable Energy Tax Incentives and WTO Law: Irreconcilably 
Incompatible? (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011) 150. See also Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition ed, 2008) 564, an 
entity will constitute a public body if it is controlled by the government. Korea – Commercial Vessels. 
14 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme For Aircraft WTO Doc 
WT/DS46/AB/R, AB-1999-1 (20 August 1999) [157].  
The Criterion of a Financial Contribution 
There are many forms of financial contribution that governments may offer to 
benefit enterprise.15 The SCM Agreement defines a financial contribution as follows: 
• a direct or potential direct transfer of funds;16  
• government revenue that is otherwise due has been foregone;17or, 
• the direct provision of goods or services.18  
Although by appearances straightforward, these categories of financial contribution 
have led to lengthy deliberations by both Panels and the Appellate Body. The 
category most relevant to the Package assistance measures is government revenue that 
has been foregone.  
The concept of ‘foregone revenue’ was considered by the Panel in some detail 
in the US – FSC dispute. 19 In this dispute, members challenged the provisions of the 
United States Internal Revenue Code that established special tax treatment for foreign 
sales corporations. The challenge was issued on the basis that this tax treatment was 
inconsistent with the obligations of the SCM Agreement.20 
The Panel for this dispute considered whether the phrase ‘otherwise due’ 
implied a normative benchmark.21 The Panel acknowledged that this benchmark must 
rest in actual substantive realities rather than being restricted to a ‘formalistic’ 
                                                
15 Ghiollarnath, above n 13, 150. 
16 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force1 January 1995) Annex 1A ('Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures') Article 1.1 (a)(1)(i). 
17 Ibid Article 1.1 (a)(1)(ii). 
18 Ibid Article 1.1 (a)(1)(iii). 
19 Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations - Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WTO Doc WT/DS108/AB/RW, AB-2001-8 
(14 January 2002). This dispute involved recourse to the Panel by the EC as it was suggested that the 
United States had not complied with the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. See Panel Report, 
United States - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations' - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU 
by the European Communities, WTO Doc WT/DS108/RW (20 August 2001) [1.6]. 
20 Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations - Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WTO Doc WT/DS108/AB/RW, AB-2001-8 
(14 January 2002) [2]. 
21 Ibid  
approach.22 As such, external norms, specifically of the jurisdiction in question, must 
inform the benchmark for revenue ‘otherwise due’.  
The Panel in the first instance for this dispute proposed a ‘but for’ test to 
determine whether government revenue was otherwise due. This was subsequently 
considered by the Appellate Body:  
The Panel had interpreted the term “otherwise due” as referring to the 
situation that would prevail “but for” the United States’ tax measures 
under consideration. The Panel held that it would determine whether, absent 
these measures, there would be a higher tax liability, meaning that it would 
examine the situation “that would exist but for the measure in question”23 
The Appellate Body cautioned against the use of this test in all circumstances. It 
suggested that it would be relatively simple for a member to legislate to avoid 
breaching such an obligation:24   
As Members, in principle, have the sovereign authority to determine their 
own rules of taxation, the comparison under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM 
Agreement must necessarily be between the rules of taxation contained in the 
contested measure and other rules of taxation of the Member in question. 
Such a comparison enables Panels and the Appellate Body to reach an 
objective conclusion, on the basis of the rules of taxation established by a 
Member.25 
The Appellate Body in this dispute declared that it is the members’ own right to 
choose what to tax and what not to tax. 26 This means, the member itself sets this 
benchmark. It is not defined through a global norm for taxation of a particular 
commodity or type of income. Rather the comparison is of the domestic fiscal 
                                                
22 Panel Report, United States - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations' - Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WTO Doc WT/DS108/RW (20 August 2001) [8.37].  
23 WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 
2007) 756. 
24 Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, WTO Doc 
WT/DS108/AB/RW, AB-2001-8 (20 February 2000) [91] cited in WTO Analytical Index: Guide to 
WTO Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 757. 
25 Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, WTO Doc 
WT/DS108/AB/RW, AB-2001-8 (20 February 2000) [89]-[90]. 
26 Ibid. 
treatment of ‘legitimately comparable income’,27 or comparable obligations.  In other 
words what is ‘otherwise due’ depends on the rules of taxation that members establish 
for themselves. Therefore, the comparison required to determine whether revenue has 
been foregone relates to the jurisdiction itself rather than to what other WTO 
members choose to tax. 
The Conferral of a Benefit 
Once it has been established that a financial contribution has been made by 
government, for a subsidy to exist it must cause a benefit to be conferred. The first 
point to note with regard to ‘benefit’ is that its existence must be satisfied 
independently of financial contribution. In the Brazil – Aircraft dispute the Panel 
determined that a financial contribution had not been tendered. This was reached on 
the basis that no benefit had been conferred. The Appellate Body for this case was 
quick to reprimand the Panel for this error, noting that: 
the Panel compounded its error in finding that the "financial contribution" ... 
is not a "potential direct transfer of funds" by reasoning that a letter of 
commitment does not confer a "benefit".  In this way, in its interpretation of 
Article 1.1(a)(i), the Panel imported the notion of a "benefit" into the 
definition of a "financial contribution".  This was a mistake.  We see the 
issues – and the respective definitions – of a "financial contribution" and a 
"benefit" as two separate legal elements in Article 1.1 of the  SCM 
Agreement, which  together  determine whether a subsidy exists...28 
Although this separation is acknowledged, Ghiollarnath notes that the second 
category of financial contribution, that is revenue that was otherwise due has been 
foregone, includes a ‘built in’ benefit benchmark.29 This is because the benefit can be 
assumed by the use of the phrase ‘otherwise due’. Therefore, for this category at least, 
it is generally unnecessary to consider whether a contribution also confers a benefit.  
                                                
27 Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations - Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WTO Doc WT/DS108/AB/RW, AB-2001-8 
(14 January 2002)  cited in WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2007)  755. 
28 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme For Aircraft WTO Doc 
WT/DS46/AB/R, AB-1999-1 (20 August 1999) [157] (emphasis in original). 
29 Ghiollarnath, above n 13, 154. 
The second aspect relating to the conferral of a benefit is that the benefit must 
actually be conferred. The language of Article 1.1(b) requires that the existence or 
lack of existence of a benefit thereof is determined through consideration of the 
position of the beneficiary. In this regard, the Appellate Body in the Canada – 
Aircraft dispute rejected the argument that the benefit could be determined in 
accordance with the ‘cost to government’.30 
The term ‘benefit’… implies that there must be a recipient. This provides 
textual support for the view that the focus of the inquiry under Article 1.1(b) 
of the SCM Agreement should be on the recipient and not on the granting 
authority… we believe that Canada’s argument that ‘cost to government’ is 
one way of conceiving of ‘benefit’ is at odds with the ordinary meaning of 
Article 1.1(b)...31 
Concluding Comments 
The above listed criteria establish that a subsidy exists. However, a subsidy does 
not infringe the SCM Agreement obligations unless it also falls within one of the 
categories of prohibited or actionable subsidies. These categories are explored in 
more detail next within this article.  
1.2.2 PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES  
The SCM Agreement contains a so-called ‘traffic light approach’ to subsidies 
management. 32  Red light subsidies are prohibited, as they are viewed as an 
opportunity for trade distortion. Yellow light subsidies are actionable subsidies that 
must be specific in accordance with Article 2. Finally, green light subsidies were once 
non-actionable, and did include research subsidies, environmental subsidies and aid to 
disadvantaged regions. 33  However, the non-actionable subsidies provision has 
expired.34  
The requirements for a prohibited subsidy are contained in Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement. These subsidies fall into one of two categories: 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc 
WT/DS70/AB/R, AB-1999-2 (20 August 1999) [154] quoted in WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO 
Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2007)  762. 
32 See, eg, Poretti, above n 10, 30-31. 
33 Ibid 31. 
34 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 31. 
• export subsidies; and, 
• import substitution subsidies.35 
1.2.3 ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
The requirements to demonstrate that a subsidy is actionable are considerably 
more complex than the criteria to establish that subsidies are prohibited. These 
requirements are contained in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement. Article 5 provides 
that ‘adverse effects’ can take three different forms. These are: 
• injury to the domestic industry of another Member; 
• nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly 
to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of 
concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994; or, 
• serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. 
The nature of the criteria to demonstrate adverse effects has led to suggestions 
that Article 5 of the SCM Agreement cannot be challenged on an ‘as such’ basis. An 
‘as such’ challenge disputes the measure as it appears or the law itself. This is 
compared to an ‘as applied’ challenge that disputes how the measure is implemented. 
A panel refuted this claim in its adjudication of the US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment) dispute. In this dispute, the Panel noted that: 
It seems that the central argument that the US is making … is that that the Act 
must be applied before there can be a violation under Article 5 which, in its 
view, means that subsidies must be granted under the Act.  This is manifestly 
incorrect.36 
1.2.4 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Thus far this paper has presented the criteria that must be demonstrated by any 
member that wishes to rely on the SCM Agreement provisions. These criteria are vital 
to the analysis in this paper. In order to determine whether the Package bestows 
subsidies within the context of the WTO law, these criteria must be applied to the 
assistance measures. The next part of this paper undertakes this task.  
                                                
35 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Article 3.2 cited in Van Den Bossche, above 
n 13, 571. 
36 Panel Report, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WTO Doc 
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/R (16 September 2002) [4.463]. 
1.3 THE JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS PROGRAM 
The JCP represents the largest source of assistance for liable entities under the 
CPM.37 The basis of the JCP is that it is designed to assist emissions-intensive trade-
exposed (EITE) industries by providing them with free carbon units.38 The purpose of 
the JCP is to maintain the international competitiveness of these industries and by 
doing so prevent relocation of Australian industries to foreign countries.39  Practically 
the JCP is designed to achieve these goals by ensuring EITE industries that may incur 
significant costs through the introduction of the CPM can gradually transition to an 
economy where their GHG emissions incur costs. 
The JCP links financial support to production levels of both new and existing 
EITE industries.40 The assistance is based on historical information provided by the 
entity. However, the assistance is contingent on production remaining in Australia.41 
Assistance under the JCP distinguishes between ‘highly emissions intensive activities’ 
and ‘moderately emissions intensive activities’.42 Those activities that fall within the 
former category are eligible for free unit assistance for up to 94.5 per cent of their 
annual liability under the CPM. 43 
Assistance under the JCP is not confined to activities that incur a direct 
emissions liability. Costs that are incurred by companies that relate to indirect 
emissions, that do not require the surrender of carbon units, are also supported by the 
JCP. 44 These additional costs include all additional charges incurred as a result of 
electricity use, where costs have increased as a result of the introduction of the CPM 
                                                
37 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia) 15. 
38 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) ss143-144. 
39 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia) 151. 
40 Despite providing assistance to ‘industries’ for ‘activities’ based on ‘production levels’ the impact of 
the subsidies would be on the products manufactured through these activities. Therefore, the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures applies, as an Agreement to regulate subsidies 
on products.  
41 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia). 
42 Australian Government, Commentary on Exposure Draft Regulations for the Jobs and 
Competitiveness Program under the Clean Energy Bill (September 2011) 8. 
43 Ibid. 
44 This assistance requires that any additional costs incurred by industries as a result of the GHG price 
mechanism are assessed.  
and other charges relating to the Package.45 This indirect assistance is also provided in 
the form of free carbon units.  
The eligibility for the JCP is based on an entity’s emissions intensity and trade 
exposure. 46  The JCP links trade exposure to a quantitative assessment and a 
qualitative test. The quantitative test requires that the ratio of the ‘value of imports 
and exports to the value of domestic production’ be greater than 10 per cent in any of 
the eligible years.47 The program’s emissions intensity threshold is an ‘average 
emissions per million dollars of revenue or emissions per million dollars of value-
added.’48 If the quantitative test is not satisfied, then the qualitative test may be used. 
This test requires a liable entity demonstrate a lack of capacity for passing on costs to 
its customers due to international competition.49  
 Some commentators have suggested that the JCP may insulate EITE industries 
to the extent that it may provide some ‘unintended protectionism’.50 Certainly, the 
documentation supporting the introduction of the JCP provides some evidence that its 
intention may not align with the requirements of the SCM Agreement.51 For example, 
the Explanatory Memorandum to the Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Cth) states that the JCP 
is ‘targeted towards industries that conduct trade-exposed activities and have the most 
significant exposure to a carbon price.’52  
This and other similar statements raise the question of whether the JCP is a 
subsidy and, as such, whether it complies with the relevant laws of the WTO that are 
designed to govern this issue.  
                                                
45 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia) 154. 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency,  'Assessment of Activities for the  Purposes of 
the Jobs and Competitiveness Program' (Guidance Paper, Australian Government, September 2011) 22.  
46 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Securing Australia's Energy Future (2004) 115, Table 15. 
47 Ibid. Eligible years are 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07 or 2007-08. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency,  'Assessment of Activities for the  Purposes 
of the Jobs and Competitiveness Program' (Guidance Paper, Australian Government, September 2011) 
28. 
50 Harry Clarke and Robert Waschik, 'Designing a Carbon Price Policy: Is the Australian Climate Plan 
Fair to Australia's Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries?' (2012) 45(1) Australian Economic 
Review 105, 105. 
51 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Steve Charnovitz and Jisun Kim, Global Warming and the World Trading 
System (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009) 92; Revised Explanatory Memorandum, 
Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia) 35. 
52 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011 (Commonwealth of Australia) 151. 
1.3.1 THE ISSUE OF A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION BY GOVERNMENT? 
In order to determine if the assistance that the JCP provides amounts to a 
financial contribution, the assistance must fulfil one of the three categories under the 
SCM Agreement. Importantly, the satisfaction of this category does not necessarily 
mean a benefit exists. 53  A benefit must be demonstrated independently of the 
existence of a financial contribution.  
As mentioned above there are three categories of financial contribution within 
the SCM Agreement.54 A financial contribution may be any one of the following:  
• a direct or potential direct transfer of funds;55  
• government revenue otherwise due that has been foregone;56 or, 
• the direct provision of goods or services.57  
The provision of assistance under the JCP is in the form of free carbon unit allocation, 
which during the fixed price period of the CPM will cost in excess of $23 per unit.58 
Although it is possible to argue that the JCP provides a financial contribution in any 
one of the three forms, it is most likely to fall within the category of revenue that is 
otherwise due that has been foregone.   
It was noted above that the measure of ‘revenue due’ will be based on a 
member’s own taxation requirements. Using a country’s own taxation requirements as 
a benchmark means that it will be unnecessary to determine whether other WTO 
members have imposed similar levels of carbon pricing domestically. In this regard, 
because a country’s own taxation requirements are the required benchmark, the 
conjecture here is that the provision of free carbon units within Australia is ‘revenue 
foregone’.  
                                                
53 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme For Aircraft WTO Doc 
WT/DS46/AB/R, AB-1999-1 (20 August 1999) [157] (emphasis in original). 
54 Ghiollarnath, above n 13, 150. 
55 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force1 January 1995) Annex 1A ('Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures') Article 1.1 (a)(1)(i). 
56 Ibid Article 1.1 (a)(1)(ii). 
57 Ibid Article 1.1 (a)(1)(iii). 
58 These units were to cost $23 for 2012, $24.15  for 2013, $25.40 for 2014. Rosemary Lyster, 
'Australia's Clean Energy Future Package: Are We There Yet?' (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal 446, 450. 
The justification for the claim that the provision of free carbon units is ‘revenue 
foregone’ is reflected by the following example. Company A, a liable entity under the 
CPM, is carrying on an eligible activity under the JCP and is categorised as a highly 
emissions intensive company. During an eligible year of the CPM Company A has 
emitted 500,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e). The consequence of 
assistance measures of the JCP is that where Company A would have been required to 
purchase 500 carbon units, they need only purchase 27 units. The other 473 have been 
provided free by regulator in accordance with the JCP. The regulator has foregone 
revenue from 473 units.59  
The alternative may be demonstrated by considering Company B. Company B 
does not carry on an EITE activity and is therefore ineligible for assistance. If 
Company B emits 500,000 tonnes of CO2-e it must purchase all 500 carbon units.60 If 
the first fixed price period is used in this example, Company A would be liable to pay 
$621 while Company B’s expense would amount to $11,500. Therefore, when the 
circumstances of the market within Australia are examined, it can be demonstrated 
that the JCP enables revenue that is otherwise due, to be foregone. It follows that the 
JCP satisfies the first requirement of a subsidy. 
To establish that the government has foregone due revenue also fulfils the 
second requirement of the subsidy definition. That is, that the financial contribution 
was made by government.61 The satisfaction of the category of ‘revenue foregone’ 
arguably also satisfies the third requirement of the definition of subsidy, namely that a 
benefit has been conferred.62 Although this is not disputed, this criterion requires 
slightly more explanation.  
1.3.2 THE CONFERRAL OF A BENEFIT 
There is no definition of ‘benefit’ within the SCM Agreement. However, Article 
14 of this agreement offers some guidance to resolve whether a benefit exists.63 As 
noted in each of the article’s subparagraphs, the provision of a financial contribution 
                                                
59 This is based on a 94.5 per cent assistance level.  
60 This simplistic example does not take account of ACCUs, eligible international units, or the 
secondary market. Clearly the use of these GHG units would change the government entitlement.  
61 Ghiollarnath, above n 13, 155. 
62 Ibid. 
63 This article is contained within Part V of the SCM Agreement, which is concerned specifically with 
countervailing duties.  
by government will only be beneficial where the contribution deviates from usual 
market conditions. For example, in the Canada - Aircraft dispute, the Appellate Body 
asserted that for a benefit to exist the recipient of the financial contribution had to be 
better off than they would otherwise have been.64 In this dispute the marketplace was 
deemed the appropriate ground for comparison.65 This confirmed the position of the 
Appellate Body in the US — Lead and Bismuth II dispute.66 In this dispute the 
Appellate Body declared that: 
The question whether a "financial contribution" confers a "benefit" depends, 
therefore, on whether the recipient has received a "financial contribution" on 
terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market.67   
The question of which methodology is the most appropriate for the computation 
of a benefit was explored in the US – Softwood Lumber disputes. The Panel in US – 
Softwood Lumber III concluded that a member’s benefit could only be calculated by 
comparing the market conditions in the Member’s own territory.68  
The issue of which markets are appropriate for comparison also arose in the US 
– Softwood Lumber IV dispute.69 In this dispute the United States authorities relied on 
‘cross-border comparisons’ between timber prices in the United States and those in 
Canada to calculate the amount of the countervailing measure.70 The Panel noted this 
approach and suggested that it was erroneous: 
[i]n light of the fact that the USDOC acknowledged the existence of a private 
stumpage market in Canada, we find that the resort to US prices as the 
benchmark for the determination of benefit on grounds that private prices in 
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Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc WT/DS236/R (27 September 2002) 6 [4.21], 116 [8.1].  
69 Panel Report, United States — Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain 
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Canada were distorted is inconsistent with Article 14 (d) [of the] SCM 
Agreement. 71 
Despite this assertion by the Panel, the Appellate Body for this dispute 
ultimately ruled against Canada on this issue and accepted the United States’ position 
that the large volume of government sales distorted Canadian prices.72 The Appellate 
Body suggested that in a case where there was no adequate private market in the 
exporting country, alternative methodologies could be considered.73 It noted: 
an investigating authority may use a benchmark other than private prices of 
the goods in question in the country of provision, when it has been 
established that those private prices are distorted, because of the predominant 
role of the government in the market as a provider of the same or similar 
goods. When an investigating authority resorts, in such a situation, to a 
benchmark other than private prices in the country of provision, the 
benchmark chosen must, nevertheless, relate or refer to, or be connected with, 
the prevailing market conditions in that country, and must reflect price, 
quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of 
purchase or sale, as required by Article 14(d).74 
For this reason, it is generally a member’s own market that must provide the 
benchmark for the existence of a benefit. However, where that market has been 
‘distorted’ through the role of the government, another market may set the appropriate 
benchmark. This is only where that other market demonstrates an adequate 
connection to the conditions of the market under scrutiny.  
In order to illustrate that the JCP confers a benefit, it is therefore necessary to 
consider the conditions of the market, as it is these that provide the standard for 
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analysis.75  Before these conditions are explored, it is recognised that there may be a 
reasonable suggestion that the JCP does not confer an actual benefit at all. This is 
because of the requirement that any beneficiary of the JCP may need to surrender the 
carbon units allocated to them for their emissions liability.  
The benefit offered to eligible entities by the JCP appears short-lived. This is 
because the free units issued are surrendered to the regulator almost immediately as 
payment for the corresponding liability imposed by the CPM. An argument against 
the existence of a benefit may be bolstered by the requirement that beneficiaries of the 
JCP must also abide by the reporting and record keeping requirements imposed by the 
Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (the Clean Energy Act).76 Therefore, the requirement 
to report may partially offset the benefit that the free carbon units may provide.  
The success of this argument is doubtful when the SCM Agreement 
jurisprudence is considered. The Appellate Body has determined that subsidies are to 
be judged in accordance with the market where it exists, rather than against the tax 
programs and regulatory requirements imposed that accompany any provision of 
assistance.77 This argument is also likely to fail on the basis that the JCP offers 
assistance for both direct and indirect emissions from electricity and steam use.78 
Because liability is only imposed for direct emissions, the monetary value of the JCP 
assistance may be greater than the value of a participant’s liability under the CPM. 
The inclusion of a buy-back mechanism in the fixed price period and the 
transferability of JCP units in the fixed price period are evidence of this.79 It follows 
that beneficiaries under the JCP receive a benefit. This conclusion is supported by the 
reasoning of the Appellate Body in the US – FSC dispute where it was pointed out 
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that ‘tax exemptions … confer upon the recipient the obvious benefit of reduced tax 
liability and, therefore, reduced tax payments.’80   
Contemporary Existence of the JCP Benefit 
Another element potentially raised by the present tense verb phrase, ‘is 
conferred’, in Article 1.1(b) is timing. In other words, whether there is a requirement 
that the benefit continues to exist. In the US – Lead and Bismuth II dispute the United 
States argued that the use of the present tense in Article 1 required that a benefit only 
had to be demonstrated at the time of the ‘financial contribution’.81 The Appellate 
Body rejected this argument and suggested that the article did not resolve the issue of 
timing:82 
The United States ... appeals the Panel's finding that the investigating 
authority must demonstrate the existence, during the relevant period of 
investigation or review, of a continued ‘benefit’ from a prior ‘financial 
contribution’ ... We do not agree with the Panel's implied view that ... an 
investigating authority must  always  establish the existence of a "benefit" 
during the period of review  in the same way as  an investigating authority 
must establish a "benefit" in an original investigation ... In an original 
investigation, the investigating authority must establish that all conditions set 
out in the SCM Agreement for the imposition of countervailing duties are 
fulfilled.  In an administrative review, however, the investigating authority 
must address those issues which have been raised before it.83 
This reasoning indicates that to bring a dispute before a Panel, it is necessary that the 
complainant demonstrate all elements of a subsidy. However, should these elements 
cease to exist, the Appellate Body may still consider the circumstances that existed at 
the time of the Panel ruling.  
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Interestingly, the fact that a measure is withdrawn or expires does not prevent a 
Panel from ruling upon its compliance issues with the WTO law.84 This was made 
clear by the following statement in the US – Wool Shirts and Blouses dispute:85 
In the absence of an agreement between the parties to terminate the 
proceedings, we think it is appropriate to issue our final report regarding the 
matter set out in the terms of reference of this Panel in order to comply with 
our mandate ... notwithstanding the withdrawal of the US restraint.86 
In the Australia – Automotive Leather dispute a retrospective remedy was 
imposed on a past subsidy.87 This ruling was met with significant criticism from the 
members of the WTO at the time, due to the possibility that it could open complaints 
for subsidies that had been long revoked.88  This supports the conclusion that to bring 
a matter before a Panel that has either been withdrawn or has expired should be 
accompanied by the need to show a continued benefit. The fact that a subsidy had 
once existed should not be enough to initiate a challenge.  
This issue is particularly relevant to the analysis of the JCP as a subsidy. This is 
because the Clean Energy Act states that the purpose of the JCP is to provide 
transitional assistance. 89 Despite this claim of temporary status, there is nothing 
within the legislation detailing how assistance will be phased out.90 Rather the Clean 
Energy Act requires that when the JCP is to be cancelled, periods of notice must be 
accorded to those who are eligible for assistance.91  
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On the basis of this analysis, the JCP fulfils the definition of a subsidy under the 
SCM Agreement.92 Although this is a significant finding, it is not the final element 
that a complainant will need to demonstrate to challenge the JCP successfully. To 
establish a breach of the SCM Agreement requirements, a subsidy must also be either 
prohibited or actionable.   
1.3.3 THE PROHIBITION OF THE JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS PROGRAM  
For the SCM Agreement to prohibit a subsidy, that subsidy must be either an 
export subsidy or an import substitution subsidy. The former category is demonstrated 
by establishing a connection between export levels and the provision of a subsidy. 
The latter category of prohibited subsidy forbids import substitution subsidies. Article 
3.1(b) prohibits ‘subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.’93 For this reason, to 
classify the JCP as a prohibited subsidy, it must be an export subsidy, as there is no 
link to the use of domestic over imported goods within the program.  
For an export subsidy to be demonstrated three criteria must be established. 
First, a framework must grant a subsidy; second, the grant must be ‘tied to’ 
something; and finally that something is ‘actual or anticipated exportation or export 
earnings’.94 There is no difference in the outcome if a subsidy is de jure or de facto 
contingent. Either way it is prohibited.  
The eligibility for the JCP is based on both emissions intensity and an 
assessment of trade exposure.95 The emissions intensity test is not relevant to the 
question of whether the JCP is a prohibited subsidy and therefore it is not explored 
here. The trade exposure test will provide the basis to evaluate whether the JCP 
assistance is a prohibited export subsidy.  
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As was noted earlier, the test for the trade exposure of an activity within the 
context of the JCP is based on a quantitative assessment or a qualitative test. The 
quantitative assessment requires the ratio of the ‘value of imports and exports to the 
value of domestic production’ is greater than 10 per cent in any of the eligible years.96 
If this is not established, then the qualitative test, requiring a lack of capacity for 
passing on costs due to international competition, may be relied upon.97  
Dispute settlement bodies have not been inclined to examine the ‘many reasons’ 
motivating legislators. 98  Rather, they have preferred to examine the ‘design, 
architecture and structure’99 of a measure ‘to permit identification of a measure's 
objectives or purposes as revealed or objectified in the measure itself.’100 Despite this, 
it is recognised here that it is useful to consider the reasons for the inclusion of the 
trade-exposure criterion in the JCP. These reasons provide greater understanding of 
this provision and may assist in the determination of whether the JCP represents an 
export subsidy.  
The Australian legislators have introduced the JCP in response to ‘the impact 
that the [carbon pricing] mechanism may have on the international competitiveness of 
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities.’ 101  The Explanatory Memorandum 
notes: 
 the Program provides significant support for jobs and protects the 
competitiveness of these emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries from 
risks for emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities to be located in, or 
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relocated to, foreign countries as a result of different climate change policies 
applying in Australia compared to foreign countries.102 
Therefore, the intention of this program is in part to protect the competitiveness of 
industries that may be vulnerable to international pricing. This demonstrates a link 
between the JCP and a desire to maintain export levels from Australian industries.  
Nevertheless, there are some barriers to finding the JCP is a prohibited subsidy.  
First, the eligibility under the JCP is based on past performance not future or current 
export performance. For this reason, the meaning of ‘actual or anticipated exportation 
or export earnings’ is relevant. ‘Anticipated earnings’ describes future earnings rather 
than those that have occurred in the past.103 This does not accord with the eligibility 
test under the JCP. 
In contrast ‘actual earnings’ describe earnings that exist as matters of fact.104 
This denotes an element of past performance.  For earnings to exist in fact, the act of 
exportation must have occurred in the past. However, the test of trade exposure under 
the JCP is not in the immediate past. The years that are relevant under the JCP are 
2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07 or 2007-08. Therefore, the issue arises whether these 
years are too far in the past to have any bearing on contemporary export levels.  
Therefore, there are arguments both for and against the conclusion that the JCP 
is a prohibited subsidy. On the one hand, only one of two criteria for JCP assistance 
relates to actual exportation, albeit many years in the past. On the other hand, the 
program provides the subsidy regardless of whether the entities export or sell the 
product in the domestic market. To clarify: the activity itself attracts the subsidy, not 
the installation or the firm that has a greater portion of the export market share. 
Therefore, the result of this ‘subsidy’ will not be to reduce the cost of exported goods 
in relation to the domestic market. Products destined for the domestic market will 
receive the same benefits. Hence, the subsidy is not provided on the contingency that 
the products of an entity will actually be exported.  
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For this reason, it may be necessary to examine the intention behind the 
introduction of the JCP. As the subsidy is based on apprehension that Australian 
industries’ international market share will decrease, it is possible to argue that the 
intention is protectionist and therefore it should be prohibited.105 On this basis, there 
is a line of reasoning that supports that this measure is an export subsidy and 
prohibited by the SCM Agreement. 106 Certainly, because of the strict criteria within 
the WTO law surrounding prohibited subsidies, there are compliance risks with 
linking any subsidy to export levels. 
1.3.4 THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTION PROVISIONS 
When the WTO members first introduced the SCM Agreement, it contained a 
provision that listed a number of non-actionable subsidies.  These subsidies include 
research subsidies, environmental subsidies and aid to disadvantaged regions.107 The 
non-actionable subsidies provision has since expired in accordance with Article 31 of 
the SCM Agreement.108 Therefore, there are no exception provisions under the SCM 
Agreement itself.  
Following the China – Audiovisual dispute settlement report109 there has been 
some speculation about the use of the GATT exception provisions for other Annex 1A 
agreements.110 The General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A appears to contradict 
this. It provides for resolution of a conflict between the GATT 1994 and other 
agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. This suggests that in the event of a 
conflict between the provisions of GATT 1994 and any other agreement of Annex 
1A, the provisions of the non-GATT agreements are given priority. This note reads:  
In the event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to 
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the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in the 
agreements in Annex 1A as the “WTO Agreement”), the provision of the 
other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict. 111 
 Certainly, until recently the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A left little 
doubt that the GATT exceptions could only be used to excuse a GATT 
infringement.112 However, the reasoning of the Appellate Body in the China – 
Audiovisual dispute now leaves this issue somewhat unresolved.113 
In the China – Audiovisual dispute the United States challenged a number of 
measures limiting the right to import reading materials and audiovisual home 
entertainment products into China.114 These measures were challenged under China’s 
Protocol of Accession rather than the GATT 1994.115 To justify the breaches, China 
relied on Article XX of the GATT. China did this even though there were no breaches 
of the GATT. 116  
While the Panel did not make a decision on this issue, the Appellate Body 
allowed the exception to apply.117 The Appellate Body’s reasoning hinged on the 
following sentence of China’s Accession Protocol: '[w]ithout prejudice to China's 
right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement.’118 The use of 
this sentence in the Accession Protocol enabled justification for using a GATT 
exception for a ‘non-GATT’ breach.  
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The conclusion here is that although this decision may have proverbially 
cracked open the door to the application of GATT exceptions to non-GATT 
provisions, a clearer decision is necessary for that door to swing open. Howse made 
this clear when suggesting 
the [Appellate Body] would also have to make the important jurisprudential 
step of finding that Article XX applies to the SCM Agreement (a step that 
now seems more plausible after what the AB seemed to say about Article XX 
and the right to regulate in China-Publications).119 
Using this rationale, there are no existing exceptions to the SCM Agreement 
requirements and therefore any established breaches cannot be justified.  
1.4 THE IMPACT OF ASSISTANCE MEASURES ON THE STEEL 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
Although the JCP is the largest source of assistance introduced by the Clean 
Energy Package, it is not the only source that may be deemed a subsidy in the context 
of the SCM Agreement. This section of this paper focuses on the steel manufacturing 
industry.  
The legislation establishing the STPP was introduced separately from the Clean 
Energy Package.120 However, the operation of the STPP is inextricably linked to the 
Clean Energy Act and the broader Package. This is reflected by the fact that the STPP 
legislation was designed to commence operation after the Clean Energy Act received 
Royal Assent.121   
The STPP is an entitlement program specific to the Australian Steel Industry. 
Some entities will be able to claim the STPP assistance in addition to the allocation of 
free carbon units under the JCP.122  The objective of the STPP is to improve 
environmental outcomes for the Australian Steel Manufacturing Industry and to 
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promote the development of workforce skills in the industry.123 Specifically, the 
regulator administers this program to enable eligible corporations to enhance the 
competitiveness and economic sustainability of the Australian steel manufacturing 
industry in a ‘low carbon economy’.124  
A corporation is eligible to apply for assistance under the STPP if it is 
responsible for producing at least 500,000 tonnes of crude carbon steel through one of 
the methods listed in the Steel Transformation Plan Act 2011 (Cth) (the Steel 
Transformation Plan Act).125 Therefore, to establish that the STPP is a subsidy, the 
following questions remain outstanding: 
• is the STPP a financial contribution? 
• is this a contribution made by government? and, 
• is there a benefit conferred by the contribution? 
 The Financial Contribution of the STPP 
The STPP originally included two separate assistance components. The 
Competitiveness Assistance Advance (CAA) was introduced to assist the steel 
industry to transition to a ‘low carbon economy’.126 Funds from the CAA were not 
issued after 30 June 2012. Therefore, this is an expired subsidy. However, the fact 
that a measure has expired does not preclude a Panel from arbitrating on its 
compliance with the SCM Agreement.127 The CAA assistance was in the form of a 
direct transfer of funds and therefore there is little difficulty in concluding that this 
measure satisfies this subsidy requirement. Despite recognising this, the focus of the 
following analysis is on the existing assistance measures of the STPP. 
The second aspect of the STPP is referred to as the Steel Transformation Plan 
(STP).128 Similar to the CAA the STP provides assistance in the form of funds 
transferred by the government to eligible entities.129 The payments are legislated to 
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cease on 31 December 2016.130  As noted for the CAA, there is no difficulty in 
satisfying the requirement of a financial contribution based on this form of assistance.   
Does the STPP Provide a Benefit? 
It has been recognised that the demonstration of a benefit requires a 
comparison. This comparison necessitates that the conditions of the contribution are 
more favourable for the recipient than those of the broader market.131 It is evident that 
an eligible corporation under the STPP will benefit from the assistance measures 
provided.132 However, the payments made in accordance with the STPP are for ‘for 
eligible innovation, eligible investment and eligible production activities.’133 These 
categories are defined in the Steel Transformation Plan Act and include a broad range 
of activities.134 Eligible corporations are required to submit an annual business plan 
detailing strategies to meet the requirements for this assistance.135 
While it could be suggested that the obligations imposed on the eligible 
corporations may negate any benefits, it is unlikely that a Panel or Appellate Body 
will take this view.  As noted previously, obligations that accompany a financial 
contribution do not have an impact on the existence of a benefit according to the rules 
of the SCM Agreement. The STPP provides a benefit when a comparison is made 
with the market in general. Therefore, the conclusion here is that the STPP is a 
subsidy within the SCM Agreement definition.  
1.4.1 IS THE STPP A PROHIBITED SUBSIDY? 
The Australian Steel Manufacturing Industry is a trade-exposed industry.136 
Despite this, the criteria for the STPP subsidy do not include a condition that a 
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recipient exports. Notably, the Appellate body has made it clear that to establish an 
export subsidy it is insufficient to demonstrate that a beneficiary exports products.137  
Because there is no evidence that the STPP is contingent on exports it is not 
prohibited under the SCM Agreement. However, the category of actionable subsidies 
may be relevant. This is especially so when the combined effects of the subsidies 
available to the steel manufacturing industry are examined.  The manufacturing of 
steel is an eligible activity under the JCP.138 It is highly emissions-intensive and 
therefore eligible for the maximum assistance available under the JCP. The assistance 
offered to this industry under the JCP is in addition to assistance of the STPP.139  
1.4.2 IS THE STEEL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY THE RECIPIENT OF ACTIONABLE 
SUBSIDIES? 
Article 5 requires that ‘no member should cause adverse effects to the interests 
of other members’ through injury to domestic industry or nullification or impairment 
of benefits accruing under GATT 1994 or cause serious prejudice to the interests of 
another member. 140 As such, there are three categories of adverse effects for an 
actionable subsidy. Before considering each of these categories, it is important to note 
a subsidy must be specific to be actionable.  
Specificity 
The product of steel is used in a variety of secondary products. This variety has 
the effect of causing some diversity in the steel industry. There is no existing test to 
determine the breadth of the ‘industry’ requirement in the Article 2 specificity 
requirement.141 This is clear from the statements of the Panel in the US – Cotton 
dispute.142  In this dispute the Panel determined: 
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The breadth of this concept of "industry" may depend on several factors in a 
given case.  At some point that is not made precise in the text of the 
agreement…a subsidy would cease to be specific because it is sufficiently 
broadly available throughout an economy as not to benefit a particular limited 
group of producers of certain products… Whether a subsidy is specific can 
only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 143  
The term specificity, as it relates to industry and enterprise, was clarified in the 
US – Softwood Lumber IV dispute.144 In this case the Panel concluded that grouping 
‘certain enterprises’ did not require that all enterprises produce the same specific end-
products. For example, industries such as ‘wooden kitchen cabinet and bathroom 
vanity’ industry and the ‘wooden door and windows’ industry were too specific.145 
Rather a group of ‘certain enterprise’ need only commercially engage with a similar 
‘type of product’. In this dispute the ‘wood products industry’ was sufficiently 
specific.146  
On the basis of the Panel’s reasoning on the US – Softwood Lumber IV dispute 
it is apparent that assistance to the steel manufacturing industry will be sufficiently 
specific to satisfy SCM Agreement requirements in Article 2. Indeed, the Panel’s 
reasoning suggests that it will be unnecessary to consider the specific uses of the steel 
manufactured.  Rather, as the assistance is granted when the ‘type of product’ 
manufactured is steel, the assistance will be deemed specific.  
Nullification or Impairment 
One of the least used categories of actionable subsidies is the category 
demonstrating adverse effects through ‘nullification or impairment’. The current 
section’s analysis can exclude the examination of the ‘nullification or impairment’ 
effect. This category prohibits members from nullifying or impairing a benefit 
attained from tariff concession negotiations. The product of steel does have a tariff 
concession listed within the Australian Schedule of Concessions. However, this 
category of ‘adverse effect’ is only applicable where the nullification or impairment 
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of benefits is undertaken on a systematic basis.147 This systematic basis is not 
demonstrated here. Therefore, the effects of the steel manufacturing subsidies are 
required to cause either ‘injury’ or ‘serious prejudice’ to be actionable.  
‘Injury’ and ‘Serious Prejudice’ 
The categories of ‘injury’ and ‘serious prejudice’ have distinct requirements 
listed within the SCM Agreement itself. These categories both require that either an 
‘injury to a domestic industry’148 or ‘serious prejudice to another member’s export 
interests’ is identified. Further, the subsidy in question must be demonstrated to be the 
cause of the adverse effect. Both these categories generally require that the injury or 
serious prejudice is in relation to a ‘like product’.149 
The Appellate Body has acknowledged that different criteria establish the 
existence of these two categories, but that these criteria may also be relevant to inform 
the other: 
although "material injury" is a distinct concept from "serious prejudice" and 
that the factors to be considered in each determination are set out in Article 
15 and Article 6.3 respectively, the Appellate Body has observed that, while 
provisions that relate to a determination of "injury" rather than "serious 
prejudice" must not automatically be transposed into Part III of the SCM 
Agreement, they may nevertheless be relevant.150 
Therefore, the criteria for these categories are in some cases specific and distinct, but 
can also be relevant to both.  
 Importantly, the criteria to establish these two categories of actionable 
subsidies are fundamentally measureable in nature. They require that comparisons are 
made.151 Certainly, it is difficult from the language of the Steel Transformation Plan 
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Act alone to satisfy the requirements of either of these categories. As the scope of this 
paper does not allow consideration of the economic impacts of the subsidies, the 
analysis is necessarily limited. However, there is one important legal issue that may 
lead to a greater likelihood of a finding of an actionable subsidy. That is whether the 
impact of the subsidies should be collectively analysed. 
Wood and Edis have made the following observation in relation to the 
assistance measures under the Clean Energy Package and Steel Transformation Plan 
Act: 
The steel package [assistance measures under the Clean Energy Package] 
effectively protects the Australian [steel] industry not from a carbon price, but 
from structural adjustments in the global steel industry. This industry 
assistance cannot be justified by reference to carbon pricing. It reverts to the 
protectionist policies abandoned in the 1980s.152 
It is suggested here that, if the effects of the subsidies are considered together, 
it is foreseeable that a Panel or Appellate Body will consider that the subsidies are 
actionable. This is more probable than if the effects are examined independently.153 
Therefore, the question arises whether it is appropriate to examine the subsidies 
collectively, or as separate measures with distinct outcomes.  
 The question of collective subsidy analysis was raised in the US — Large Civil 
Aircraft (2nd complaint) dispute.154 In this dispute both the Panel and Appellate Body 
were required to consider the effects of two distinct subsidies. The Panel for this 
dispute concluded that two subsidies should not be collectively considered because of 
differences in ‘causal mechanisms’.155 However, the Appellate Body for this dispute 
disagreed with this finding: 
We are of the view that the Panel should have, in this dispute, considered 
whether the effects of … tax rate reductions complemented and supplemented 
                                                
152 Tony Wood and Tristan Edis, 'New Protectionism Under Carbon Pricing: Case Studies of LNG, 
Coal Mining and Steel Sectors' (Report No 2011-X, Grattan Institute, September 2011) 30. 
153 This would of course depend on the comparison demonstrating one of the required impacts.  
154 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade In Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), WTO Doc WT/DS353/AB/R, AB-2011-3 (12 March 2012). 
155 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade In Large Civil Aircraft (Second 
Complaint), WTO Doc WT/DS353/R (31 March 2011) 707 [7.1824]. 
the effects of … R&D subsidies … in other words, whether it would have 
been appropriate to cumulate their effects.  We do not consider the mere fact 
that the two groups of subsidies operated through distinct causal mechanisms 
could, alone, have resolved the questions of whether each group had effects 
relevant to the serious prejudice alleged and whether those effects were 
capable of being combined in the Panel's analysis of serious prejudice 
because they contributed similarly to the relevant market phenomena.156 
Using the reasoning articulated by the Appellate Body in the US — Large Civil 
Aircraft (2nd complaint) dispute, it is reasonable to conclude that the effects of the 
subsidies offered to the steel manufacturing industry should be analysed collectively. 
This means that the likelihood of finding that the steel manufacturing industry’s 
subsidies are actionable is greatly increased.  
Interestingly, the fact that one of the subsidies — the JCP — may be prohibited 
does not alter this conclusion. 157  Indeed, even if one of the subsidies is also 
prohibited, the collective ‘adverse effects’ must still be demonstrated. They will not 
be presumed.158  
The Criterion of ‘Like Products’ for ‘Adverse Effects’  
In order to demonstrate that a subsidy has caused ‘an injury’ or ‘serious 
prejudice’,159 it is often necessary that the subsidy has an adverse effect upon a ‘like 
product’. The phrase ‘like product’ is used throughout the WTO agreements. Despite 
its frequent use, this phrase has some associated complexities. The first is that it is not 
clearly defined in any of the WTO agreements or associated documentation. Second, 
it is unclear whether the definition of ‘like products’ differs depending on the article 
in which it is used.  
The definition of ‘like products’ for the purposes of the SCM Agreement is 
specifically clarified by footnote 46 within Article 15 of the SCM Agreement: 
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Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ... shall be interpreted to 
mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product 
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which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely 
resembling those of the product under consideration.160 
Van Den Bossche argues that compared to the use of the phrase ‘like products’ 
within the GATT, the definition used by the SCM Agreement seems somewhat more 
narrow and specific.161 However, the Panel for the Indonesia – Autos dispute found 
the interpretation of the phrase in other provisions of the WTO agreements to be 
‘useful guidance’ for the interpretation within the SCM Agreement.162 In this dispute 
the Panel provided a detailed list of the characteristics that can be taken into account 
when considering whether two products are like.163 These characteristics include: 
• physical characteristics; 
• brand loyalty;  
• brand image/reputation; 
• after-sales service; 
• status and resale value; 
• product use; 
• substitutability; 
• price; 
• end use; and, 
• tariff classification.164 
Without examining specific circumstances of two different steel products, it is 
difficult to draw a normative conclusion. Rather, it is possible to conclude that not all 
types of steel products will be ‘like’ but some will be. A differential in manufacturing 
process is not listed as a characteristic that changes a product’s ‘likeness’. 
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Nevertheless, different steel products will have different end-uses, different re-sale 
values and different tariff classification.165 For this reason, it will be necessary to 
consider the specific circumstances of any WTO member challenge in regards to the 
steel assistance provided under the Clean Energy Package.  
1.4.3 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The assistance measures offered to the steel manufacturing industry may be 
actionable subsidies. This conclusion is tentative. To establish the relevant actionable 
subsidy categories requires comparisons. These comparisons are of economic effects, 
while here it is only possible to consider theoretical outcomes.  
Despite this, the suggestion is that a Panel or Appellate Body should consider 
the effects of the steel manufacturing industry subsidies collectively. The collective 
analysis will intensify the beneficial effects of the subsidies for the Australian steel 
manufacturing industry. Therefore, the pre-requisite adverse effects will be more 
readily established than if the effects were separately measures.  
Finally, in order to establish that a subsidy is actionable a complainant must 
demonstrate that the impact of the ‘adverse effect’ is on a ‘like product’. This 
evaluation must take place on a case by case basis.  
1.5 THE ENERGY SECURITY FUND  
The final assistance package that this paper examines is the ESF.166 There are 
three components that make up this assistance measure. First, the fund provides both 
cash payments and free carbon units to emissions-intensive coal fired generators.167 
Second, the fund allows for compensation for the closure of 2000 megawatts of coal-
fired energy by 2020. Finally, the fund establishes an Energy Security Council.168 The 
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purpose of this new government body is to advise on risks to Australia’s energy 
supply and provide advice assuring the future energy security of the nation.169  
This paper is concerned with the ESF only to the extent that it may provide 
either a prohibited or an actionable subsidy under the law of the WTO. Therefore, the 
first limb of assistance, that enables provision of cash payments and free carbon units 
to emissions-intensive coal fired electricity generators, is the only element of this fund 
analysed in this paper.170  
The nature of energy and electricity means that it may be the subject of 
regulation either of trade in goods or trade in services.171 It is important to conclude 
which is applicable here as the requirements for subsidies under the GATS are 
substantially less onerous than those under the SCM Agreement. 172  As noted 
previously, the rules for subsidies that exist in accordance with the rules of the GATS 
only require that parties ‘enter into negotiations in order to avoid the trade distortive 
effects’. This can be contrasted with the more prescriptive remedy provisions of the 
SCM Agreement. 
In order to resolve whether the ESF is a goods or a service subsidy, the test for 
eligibility under the fund must first be examined. This examination reconciles which 
industries are beneficiaries of the assistance and on what basis the assistance is 
provided. As this is a subsidy designed to maintain ‘energy security’, it is important to 
resolve at which point the subsidy is available along the energy supply chain.  
1.5.1 ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE ENERGY SECURITY FUND 
The purpose of the assistance provided by the ESF is to maintain energy 
security by providing assistance to emissions-intensive generation assets.173 This 
assistance is intended to aid coal-fired electricity generators to face losses in the value 
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of their assets as a result of the introduction of the CPM and to ensure Australia’s 
energy security needs are met through investor confidence.174  
In order to receive assistance under the Energy Security Fund a coal-fired 
electricity establishment must satisfy the eligibility test. 175  There are three 
requirements of this test: 
• during the period between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2010 the generation 
complex must be in operation and connected to a grid with a grid 
capacity of at least 100 megawatts;176 
• between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2010 at least 95 per cent of the energy 
generated must be attributable to the combustion of coal; and, 
• the carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) emissions intensity of the 
generation complex must be greater than 1.0, where emissions intensity 
is equal to emissions divided by gigawatt hours of electricity 
generated.177 
The fund provides assistance to a ‘generation complex’ for emissions that are 
attributable to the combustion of coal to provide electricity. The provision of 
assistance is based on the ‘historical energy’ produced by a generation complex.178 
Therefore, the generators receive the subsidy for the act of generating electrical 
energy. For this reason, the impact of the subsidy will presumably be on the price, or 
the supply, of electricity.  
Electricity is a ‘secondary energy source as it is produced by the conversion of 
energy sources.’179 Electricity is not a fuel, nor is it a ‘physical substance’.180 
Predominately in Australia electricity is produced through the conversion of energy in 
coal.181 Generators can also produce electricity from other sources, such as through 
                                                
174 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s159. 
175 Ibid s160. 
176 Ibid s166. 
177 Ibid s168. 
178 Ibid s167. 
179 Australian Energy Market Operator, 'An Introduction to Australia's National Electricity Market' 
(Report, AEMO, July 2010) 2. 
180 Cottier et al, above n 171, 9. 
181 Australian Energy Market Operator, 'An Introduction to Australia's National Electricity Market' 
(Report, AEMO, July 2010) 4. 
the renewable energy sources of sun and wind.182 The WTO law position on energy 
related processes was articulated in a Note by the Secretariat in 1998 as follows: 
 In spite of the element of uncertainty regarding electricity, it seems generally 
accepted that the production of primary and secondary energy [does] not 
constitute services subject to the GATS, but result in goods, whose trade is 
subject to the GATT, as the production service is incorporated in the value of 
the good produced.  Transportation and distribution of energy constitute 
services according to the GATS if they are provided independently.  Other 
services intervene in the energy value added chain (from production to resale 
to consumers), including construction, engineering, and consulting services.  
These services, however, are better defined as energy related services rather 
than energy services.183 
For this reason it appears that electrical energy is a product within the law of the 
WTO,184 whereas energy may be depending on its source. Evidently, any energy that 
is in the form of coal, oil or gas is classified as a product or a good, but WTO law 
classification of solar energy and other renewable forms is uncertain.185 
Therefore, because the ESF provides a subsidy ‘in respect of highly emissions 
intensive generation assets’,186 the electricity generated through coal combustion is 
the subsidised product.187  This means that the subsidy assists those entities engaged 
in the production of electricity. Therefore, as electricity is accepted as a product, the 
subsidy will be regulated by the provisions of the SCM Agreement as the agreement 
relevant to products.  
This position can be contrasted with what appears to be a contrary view of the 
matter of electricity services and the GATS. Marceau indicates that the GATS may be 
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applicable across the energy generation sector when stating ‘[a]ll services related to 
trade in energy can be covered by the GATS. Thus the GATS tentacles touch a 
multitude of aspects of the energy trade.’188  Further, some commentators have 
suggested that the treatment of electricity as a good is erroneous and should be 
reconsidered. As noted: 
The fundamental divide between goods and services does not offer an 
appropriate basis for addressing and regulating energy in an integrated 
manner in domestic and international law. Electricity is a case in point. It is 
traditionally treated as a good, but in fact, by its nature and its dependence 
upon grids, it is much more like a service, or perhaps a mixture of both. There 
is no clear perception of defining energy in terms of goods and services, and 
services relating to energy are not properly defined under GATS … With the 
advent of disciplines on services … existing legal definitions of electricity 
should be reviewed … It is submitted that electricity should be defined as a 
service and should no longer be treated as a good.189 
 
Considering this, it is appropriate to understand the subsidy rules that apply to 
services along with the SCM Agreement requirements. Although it does appear at 
present that electricity will be treated as a good, it is important to remember that the 
agreements that consider goods, and those that address services, are not mutually 
exclusive. This was noted in the EC- Bananas III dispute: 
measures ... could be found to fall within the scope of both the GATT 1994 
[and the SCM Agreement] and GATS. These are measures that involve a 
service relating to a particular good or service supplied in conjunction with a 
particular good. In all such cases in this third category, the measure in 
question could be scrutinized under both the GATT 1994 and GATS. 190 
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1.5.2 THE APPLICATION OF THE SCM AGREEMENT RULES TO THE ESF 
The ESF has a number of features that are similar to the JCP. For example, the 
main source of assistance under the ESF is the provision of free carbon units to 
emissions-intensive generators. The analysis provided above in relation to the JCP is 
therefore also valid for the ESF. This paper does not re-examine whether free carbon 
units are a financial contribution that accords a benefit. Rather, the conclusion here, 
based on the above discussion, is that the ESF provides a financial contribution for the 
same reasons as the JCP.191 
On the issue of the conferral of a benefit, the WTO law jurisprudence does 
indicate that when a financial contribution is in the form of revenue foregone, the 
finding of a benefit will be assured through a ‘reduced tax liability’.192 Although this 
is accepted, an interesting issue was recently raised in the combined dispute 
settlement report of Canada – Renewable Energy and Canada – Feed in Tariff 
Program.193 In this dispute the question of a benefit arose in regards to the Canadian 
electricity market. In a split decision of the Panel it was concluded that the Canadian 
electricity market did not offer an appropriate market to determine the existence of a 
benefit.194 The Panel suggested that, as a result of prolonged government intervention, 
the market was not subject to regular competitive market forces.195  
Despite recognising the Panel’s arguments in this dispute, it is submitted here 
that the ESF would indeed offer a benefit to the recipients, on the basis of a reduced 
tax liability. In this instance, the rate of taxation levied on the electricity market may 
not prove to be the appropriate basis for comparison, simply because not all 
generators of electricity — in particular users of renewable energy — would incur 
liability through the CPM. In this regard, a more appropriate basis for comparison 
may be the degree of liability incurred by other entities through the CPM.  
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Is the ESF Actionable? 
Australia neither imports nor exports electricity internationally.196 All electricity 
produced within Australia is used in Australia. Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
the ESF promotes the use of domestic over imported products. For these reasons the 
ESF cannot be classified as a prohibited subsidy under the SCM Agreement. For the 
ESF to be challenged under SCM Agreement provisions, it must be as an actionable 
subsidy.  
To be an actionable subsidy the specificity requirement of Article 2 of the SCM 
Agreement must be demonstrated.197 Although this paper has recognised that there are 
no established guidelines for specificity, there is little doubt that the subsidy provided 
under the ESF is sufficiently specific to satisfy Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. This 
is because this fund provides a subsidy only to those industries responsible for the 
generation of electricity through the combustion of coal.198 This narrow group of 
beneficiaries will establish the necessary specificity required for an actionable 
subsidy.   
The other requirements for actionable subsidies under Article 5 of the SCM 
Agreement are less easily satisfied. As noted, for a subsidy to be actionable, it must 
demonstrate ‘adverse effects’ of which there are three categories.199 These categories 
are: 
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member; 
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits; 
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.200 
The nature of the ESF subsidy makes it conceptually difficult to classify as an 
actionable subsidy because of the issue of ‘adverse effects’. The first category of 
injury to another member’s domestic industry is not applicable. This is because the 
ESF subsidy attaches to electricity generating assets. The assistance is provided in 
accordance with liability incurred through the CPM. The emissions liability for 
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electricity generated through coal combustion is calculated on the basis of the 
quantity of coal combusted.201 The origins of both the generation assets and the coal 
combusted are irrelevant to the assistance amount. For this reason, the only market 
affected by this assistance measure is the electricity market. 
Generation of electricity is in response to demand, as it cannot be stored for 
future use. 202  Because there are no imports or exports of electricity within Australia, 
any injury the subsidy causes will be to the Australian market.203 Hence, there will be 
no injury to the domestic industry of another member.  
Similarly, the second category for actionable subsidy does not apply. This 
category requires demonstration of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing 
under GATT 1994. This is not applicable here as the nullification or impairment 
referred to is a tariff reduction.204 Given that there are no imports or exports of 
electricity to or from Australia, there are no tariffs on electricity, as demonstrated by 
Australia’s Schedule of Concessions to the GATT.205  
If the ESF is an actionable subsidy, the third category must apply. This category 
requires that no member should cause ‘serious prejudice to the export interests’ of 
another member. The difficulty with demonstrating this for a subsidy that relates to 
electricity rests in the fact that electricity is not imported into Australia. The reason 
for this is that, for foreign competition to exist, interconnection capacity between 
Australia and another member would need to be in place. 206  As Australia’s 
interconnected regions are confined within the nation’s geographical boundaries, 
harming export interests of another member is not possible.207 It follows that the ESF 
will not be an actionable subsidy under the SCM Agreement.  
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1.5.3 THE APPLICATION OF THE GATS SUBSIDIES RULES TO THE ESF 
Article XV of the GATS requires that members enter into negotiations in order 
to avoid the trade distortive effects of service subsidies.208 This provision is therefore 
more advisory than directive. However, there is one important enforceable 
requirement within the GATS subsidy provisions. 
The Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (the Guidelines)209 suggest that any subsidies that 
are discriminatory in nature within the meaning of the national treatment provision in 
Article XVII of the GATS need to be scheduled within a member’s Schedule of 
Specific Commitments.210 The direction provided by the guidelines is not necessarily 
accepted as a commonsense approach by some commentators.211 The reason for this is 
that the approach set out in the Guidelines suggests that any subsidies designed only 
for the benefit of domestic services or service suppliers must be listed as a limitation 
to national treatment within a member’s Schedule. Importantly, this does not extend 
to those service suppliers who are engaged in Mode 1 and Mode 2 service supply. As 
stated in the Guidelines: 
There is no obligation in the GATS which requires a Member to take 
measures outside its territorial jurisdiction. It therefore follows that the 
national treatment obligation in Article XVII does not require a Member to 
extend such treatment to a service provider located outside the territory of 
another Member. 212 
This means that even if the full national treatment commitments are undertaken for a 
particular service sector, only those suppliers actually present in the territory of a 
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Services (GATS) WTO Doc S/L/92 (28 March 2001) . 
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MTN.GNS/W/164 (3 September 1993) (WTO Secretariate Note) quoted in Poretti, above n 10, 141. 
member are entitled to the same subsidies offered to domestic services and service 
suppliers.213  
At this point it is relevant to refer back to the discussion regarding electricity 
generation as a good rather than a service. Because of its current understanding as a 
good by WTO members, there is no listing within the Services Sectoral Classification 
List (the SSCL) for electricity generation.214 Indeed, services recognised by the SSCL 
in relation to electricity are limited to ‘services incidental to energy distribution’. This 
will be limited to services associated with distributing and transmitting rather than 
generating electricity. In the case of Australia, only Mode 3 supply has been 
liberalised within the Australian Schedule of Commitments. 215 Because the ESF 
provides assistance on the basis of generation, there does not appear to be any existing 
commitment within the Australian Schedule of Commitments that would be infringed 
by this assistance measure.  
In support of this conclusion, there are no requirements under the ESF 
provisions for a recipient to be an Australian citizen or an Australian corporation. 
Therefore, a foreign entity could claim the benefits of the ESF as long as all other 
conditions for the grant of assistance are satisfied. Indeed, a foreign entity would only 
be excluded from these benefits in the same circumstances as an Australian entity. 
That is, the activity itself does not qualify under the conditions for the ESF. For this 
reason, in conjunction with the above considerations, the ESF complies with the 
WTO law requirements. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
Within this paper three assistance measures implemented as part (or alongside) 
the Clean Energy Package have been considered. In this regard, this paper has 
established that the JCP may be a prohibited subsidy in accordance with the rules of 
the SCM Agreement. In this case, a complainant will have access to SCM Agreement 
remedies.  
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This paper has considered the likelihood that the subsidies available to the steel 
manufacturing industry would fall within the classification of actionable subsidies 
under the SCM Agreement. The restricted analysis of this issue makes it difficult to 
conclude with any certainty on this particular matter. It may nevertheless be suggested 
that there is a strong probability that the steel industry assistance will cause ‘adverse 
effects’. This is because the effects of the applicable subsidies — being the JCP and 
the STPP — should be collectively analysed rather than separately examined.  
Finally, the ESF, by its nature, will not be either actionable or prohibited within 
the SCM Agreement. Further, although electrical energy is currently classified as a 
good by WTO members, there is some confusion associated with this. Indeed some 
commentators have suggested that electrical energy should be regulated by the GATS 
provisions rather than those of the GATT. For this reason, the GATS rules in relation 
to subsidies were briefly examined in this paper. The conclusion in this matter was 
that, even if the GATS rules did apply, the ESF would not infringe any of the 
obligations contained therein.  
Based on the analysis in this paper, there are subsidies introduced by the Clean 
Energy Package that are either prohibited or actionable in the context of the rules of 
the SCM Agreement. Failing to revise these measures could result in the initiation of 
dispute settlement proceedings before a WTO panel. Alternatively, aggrieved 
members may choose to introduce countervailing duties. Therefore, Australian 
legislators would be well advised to consider the WTO subsidies rules and make 
appropriate amendments to the Package assistance measures.  
 
